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Paying homage to the ‘Heavenly Mother’: cultural-geopolitics of the Mazu pilgrimage and 
its implications on rapprochement between China and Taiwan  
 
Abstract  
Much has been researched on tourism across (former) borders of conflict and on pilgrimage 
as a socio-cultural activity, but the relationship between the two remains poorly understood. 
Pilgrimage-tours carried out by Taiwanese devotees to the birthplace of Mazu (or Tianshang 
Shengmu – the Heavenly Mother) in Putian, China offer a significant platform to further our 
understanding of how religion can play a part in the rapprochement between China and 
Taiwan. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, this paper goes beyond the conventional state-
level analysis to discuss interactions and encounters forged at the levels of the temple 
organisations and the individual. It utilises Victor Turner’s concept of ‘communitas’ to 
understand how spiritual spaces are being performed through the pilgrimage rather than 
already existing before the pilgrimage. Importantly, the Mazu pilgrimage-tour is 
conceptualised not as a tourism product, but as both a social activity and a socialising one, 
producing opportunities for different forms of interactions between the Chinese and 
Taiwanese devotees. These ‘interactions along the side’ as opposed to state-level diplomatic 
exchanges offer insights into the ‘more-than-state’ and ‘more-than-human’ relationships 
that bind/divide devotees on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  
Keywords: Mazu pilgrimage; rapprochement; communitas; cultural-geopolitics; China; 
Taiwan        
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1. Introduction: Paying homage to the ‘Heavenly Mother’  
The ambiguous political status of Taiwan and its equivocal relationship with China has 
sustained scholarly inquiries since 1949. However, research on China-Taiwan relations has 
often focused on macro-political or state-level analyses (see, for example, Baldacchino and 
Tsai 2014 for a similar critique) In this paper, I seek to go  beyond the ‘state’ in my analysis 
of rapprochement between China and Taiwan. Rapprochement is a process experienced at 
the personal level in the everyday geo-politics of cross-strait relations. Rather than state-
level politics, I focus on micro-episodes of people-to-people interactions and performance 
of identities in pilgrimage spaces. Yet, such personal practices of identity negotiation are 
never totally detached from macro-political events, and the often assumed ‘distant 
considerations of statecraft and international diplomacy’ (Newman, 2011: 37) are very 
much part of the everyday. More specifically, and in contributing to the expanding debates 
about the role of non-state actors in political geography, I argue that religion plays a part in 
the rapprochement between China and Taiwan, and that such relations may be analysed 
not only at the level of the state, but also the temple organisations and the individual.  
The cultural proximity of people from Fujian province in China and those in Taiwan (due to 
diasporic linkages) means that religion is a common social denominator for most. Their 
common belief in the cult of Mazu or Tianshang Shengmu (the Heavenly Mother) is a case in 
point. After the establishment of informal contacts1 in 1987, pilgrims travelling from Taiwan 
to China to discover their religious roots became the ‘largest and most visible groups of 
travellers’ (Katz, 2003: 407). On 2 October 2002, a 426-member delegation made up of 
devotees from ten Mazu temples in Taiwan became the largest pilgrimage group to visit 
                                                          
1 People from Taiwan allowed by its government to visit China included war veterans, businessmen and 
industrialists, and religious pilgrims (Katz and Rubinstein, 2003: 2).  
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China (ibid.). In fact, the role of religion in China’s foreign policy has increasingly become a 
topic of scholarly interest. Recent works have explored Catholicism in Sino-Vatican relations 
(Leung, 2005), Buddhism in China-Singapore (Chia, 2008) and China-India diplomacy (Scott, 
2016), and Islam in Sino-Arab connections (Ho, 2013). The Chinese government has indeed 
utilised religion as a strategy to enhance non-state or low-level state interactions. More 
specifically, although research interests on Mazu pilgrimages are not new (e.g. Boltz, 1986; 
Sangren, 1987; Katz, 2003), those that focus on more contemporary cross-strait ones are on 
the rise (e.g. Yang, 2004; Stewart and Strathern, 2009; Hatfield, 2010; Lin, 2014).2 These 
studies are generally dominated by anthropologists and although they are important 
contributions in their own right, pilgrimage is usually treated as a tool or means by which 
certain societal ideals are achieved. For example, Lin (2014) looks at how Mazu pilgrimage 
was being utilised by devotees on Taiwan’s Mazu Island as a social imaginary to reconfigure 
their economic and social conditions. She argues that recent large-scale pilgrimages 
performed by the islanders were aimed to realign them ‘into the southeast neoliberal zone 
of China’, and to pave ‘a way for them to speculate on the possibility of becoming a 
mediator between China and Taiwan’ (ibid. p.134). In other words, there is an emphasis on 
what pilgrims do with the pilgrimage, rather than an exploration into what the pilgrimage 
does. Furthermore, as Holloway (2006: 182) argues, the geography of religion has hitherto 
focused mainly on the ‘construction and effects of religious-spiritual space’ rather than on 
the production of such spaces (although see Kong, 1992; Martin and Kryst, 1998; Game, 
2001). In other words, it is very often assumed that spiritual spaces were there before the 
pilgrimage rather than being performed through the pilgrimage. Therefore, I seek to adopt a 
perspective that understands pilgrimage as an embodied experience and a performance 
                                                          
2 It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on (Mazu) pilgrimage in the study 
of Chinese religion. See (Lin, 2014) for a brief but insightful overview. 
 5 
(Holloway, 2006; Laliberté, 2011) of a plurality of identities, and to examine pilgrims’ 
behaviour and subjectivities as revealed through personal stories. I am also interested in 
how people’s participation in such a shared religious event influences their perceptions of 
cross-strait relations and their counterparts across the Strait. 
For most Mazu devotees, a pilgrimage is often also a leisure activity in itself. A trip to the 
ancestral temple is never complete without stopovers at scenic and shopping spots. It is no 
wonder that studies on the Mazu cult and tourism between China and Taiwan tend to treat 
such religious pilgrimage as a tourist product, focusing their analyses mainly on economic 
aspects of supply and demand (see for example, Guo et al., 2006). By situating the Mazu 
pilgrimage in the cultural-geopolitical3 context of rapprochement tourism, the pilgrimage-
tour is conceptualised not as a tourism product, but as religious life that produces platforms 
for interaction and possesses the power to move people (Olaveson, 2001). As a form of 
rapprochement tourism, the pilgrimage-tour is both a social activity and a socialising one. 
Hence, the Mazu cult is seen as a potential force in creating alternative forms of 
communities between the Chinese and the Taiwanese devotees.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The rest of the paper is divided into six sections. The following section reviews the existing 
literature pertaining to tourism across (former) borders of conflict especially in its 
rapprochement orientation. This is followed by a discussion of methods employed, and a 
brief background on how the Mazu cult started, and why the various Mazu centres in 
Taiwan organise pilgrimages to the ancestral temple on Meizhou Island (China). The 
cultural-geopolitics of the Mazu pilgrimage will then be interrogated in the ensuing two 
                                                          
3 The Mazu pilgrimage is as much a cultural/religious activity as it is a geopolitical one. It plays a unique role in 
cross-strait relations. As such, I am very much interested to analyse the cultural-geopolitics of this 
phenomenon. 
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sessions, before the paper concludes with some closing thoughts on its contribution to 
existing debates and potential for future studies.  
 2. Tourism across (former) borders of conflict 
Tourism’s potential role as a vehicle for peace has been explored by many (see D’Amore, 
1988; Jafari, 1989; Richter, 1994). In terms of re-establishing ties between partitioned states, 
studies have demonstrated that rapprochement tourism could well be the forerunner for 
peace making. For instance, in the Asian context, Butler and Mao (1996) observe that the 
‘amount and type of travel’ between partitioned states can reflect and influence the 
development of relationships between them. Also, Kim and Crompton (1990) explore the 
role of tourism in reducing tension and see its potential in unifying North and South Korea, 
while Zhang (1993) argues that tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan ‘help 
promote mutual understanding,  clear  up  misunderstanding  and  strengthen unity… and  
may  further  be beneficial  to  peace  in  the  Asian  and Pacific  region  as  well as  world-
wide’ (p. 229). In recent years, there has been an emerging interest in research regarding 
battlefield tourism and its promotion of peace between enemies, both past and present. For 
example, studies by Timothy et al. (2004), Guo et al. (2006) and Cho (2007) explore the 
possibilities of reconciliation between belligerents like China and Taiwan, and North and 
South Korea.  
There are, however, sceptics about tourism’s role as a peace mediator. Empirical studies on 
visits made by Israeli students to Egypt (Milman et al., 1990), US students to the former 
Soviet Union (Pizam et al., 1991), and Greek students to Turkey (Anastasopoulous, 1992) all 
point to tourism’s limited capacity in improving the guests’ perceptions of the host 
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communities. Furthermore, Kim and Prideaux (2003) acknowledge that tourism may not 
necessarily promote people-to-people interaction and could merely serve as a political tool 
of the government. They argue that ‘tourism…is a consequence of a political process, not 
the genesis of the process’ (ibid.: 683). This is echoed by Yu (1997) who argues that travel 
between mainland China and Taiwan is sensitive to the shifting cross-strait relations.  In this 
sense, tourism is seen as a passive outcome of rapprochement rather than an active agent 
bringing about closer ties between people. In Kim and Prideaux’s example of tourism at Mt. 
Gumgang in North Korea, they report that South Korean tourists have practically no contact 
with the North Koreans as they are completely isolated by fences and armed guards. 
Therefore, Kim and Prideaux dispute Kim and Crompton’s (1990) theorisation that tourism is 
a good platform to foster people-to-people diplomacy and an eventual reunification of 
North and South Korea. In fact, the former are sceptical about the usage of tourism revenue 
by the North Koreans, fearing that ‘tourism may be the vehicle for destroying peace’ (Kim 
and Prideaux, 2003: 684) as monetary gains from tourism are used by the North to acquire 
weapons that threaten South Korea’s national security. Indeed, tourism is inherently 
(geo)political.  
Three observations can be made at this juncture. First, studies on post-conflict tourism 
exchanges tend to adopt a state-centric approach and see tourism as a panacea for peace 
(or the lack of it), without interrogating the practices of rapprochement that constitute the 
tourism process. Tourists are reduced to percentages; they become pawns of politicians and 
are portrayed as passive ‘flows’ representing ‘peaceful relations’ rather than active agents 
participating in the rapprochement process. Moreover, an increase in the number of 
tourists travelling across the Taiwan Strait does not necessarily equate to an improvement 
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in relationship or understanding between the Chinese and Taiwanese people (Zhang, 2013). 
Rather, more critical analyses are needed to understand the nuances of micro-political 
events and the various practices engaged by tourists and locals as they participate in the 
rapprochement process. The Mazu pilgrimage offers such an analytical platform. 
Second, writings on rapprochement tourism often assume the ‘universal tourist’ and are 
more interested in tourist numbers than unravelling the critical geopolitics of tourists’ 
subjectivities. As such, there is a need to qualify what we mean by ‘the Chinese/Taiwanese 
devotees/pilgrims’. They are of course not homogeneous groups of people, but are 
characterised by rich cultural entanglements in, between and across two political entities. 
They have relatives, business partners, friends, etc. residing across the border. These 
various relationships add layers of complexities to the notion of ‘the pilgrim’. Instead of a 
‘peace theory’, we need a more ‘grounded’ approach to pilgrimage/rapprochement tourism 
that moves beyond the universal pilgrim subject and experience to recognize pilgrim 
‘subjectivities and performances’ (Franklin, 2007). Instead of seeing pilgrim-tourists as 
numbers in an arithmetic formula of peace, it is more useful to think of them as active 
participants in the rapprochement process – each possessing her/his own subjectivities as 
she/he interacts with ‘the Other’ from across the border. ‘Rapprochement’ in a way implies 
the purposive stance taken by both China and Taiwan when it comes to cross-strait tourism. 
However, I am arguing that the pilgrim-tourists are not passively following states’ rhetoric, 
but are actively engaging with devotees on the other side. So although their travels and 
interactions took place in a ‘rapprochement climate’, they were also actively contributing to 
and re-shaping the rapprochement process. Yet they are not the sole subjects of 
rapprochement tourism, but form part of a network of people, infrastructure, technology 
 9 
and things (Franklin, 2007). In this sense, we need to adopt a more critical approach to 
understand the political geographies of tourism both as involving a complex relationship 
between macro and micro politics, and as an on-going process in a state of becoming.    
Third, the critique on the dominance of economic discourse in tourism studies (Franklin and 
Crang, 2001; Crang, 2004; Picken, 2006) can also be applied to the current state of research 
on rapprochement tourism. Researchers tend to focus solely on the economic implications 
of the normalisation of travel between political units, overlooking the fact that tourism is in 
itself a socio-cultural phenomenon. For instance, in their synopsis of ‘tourism between 
partitioned states’, Butler and Mao (1996) primarily discuss patterns of tourist flows, 
motivations, accessibility, cost of travel and tourist expenditure. Yet it is necessary not to 
see tourism as just ‘a logical extension of the general principle of industrial capitalism to the 
realm of leisure’ (Crang, 2004: 74), but ‘as a modern culture in and of itself.’ Of course, this 
is not to belittle studies on the economics of rapprochement tourism. My intention here is 
to highlight the importance of not only addressing the ‘why’ of tourism, but also the ‘how’. 
For example, how are common heritages managed in the midst of rapprochement tourism? 
How does tourism affect people from both sides? How are tourist destinations not only 
consumed but also constantly created by tourists? Some notable research on tourism 
exchanges between former/existing foes that go beyond the realm of economics include 
Webster and Timothy’s (2006) piece on Greek Cypriots’ perceptions of crossing the Green 
Line between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus, Lisle’s 
(2007) comparison of cultural institutions’ political narratives in the two Cypruses under the 
current pressure for peaceful reconciliation, and Hazbun’s (2009) explorations of ‘new 
geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ enabled by cross-cultural tourism between Israel 
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and Jordan. Common themes explored by these studies include ‘everyday geopolitics’, 
‘heritage at the personal scale’, and ‘post-national community imaginaries’. 
These novel research directions dovetail well with feminist contributions to critical 
geopolitics that emphasise the inclusion of the ‘everyday’ and ‘ordinary’ (e.g. Enloe, 1990; 
Smith, 2009; 2012; Pain and Staeheli, 2014). In the case of the Mazu pilgrimage, devotees 
often find themselves negotiating their political and religious identities when 
communicating with their counterparts on ‘the other side’. Therefore, rapprochement does 
not only involve state-to-state macro politics, but can also be personal and intimate. 
Furthermore, cross-strait tourism is not only for those seeking leisure, but also for people 
seeking relatives and territorial re-attachments of places they were once forced to leave. In 
this respect, Webster and Timothy (2006) discuss what they call ‘personal heritage tourism’ 
while Hazbun (2009) talks about ‘return tourism’. Since the Cyprus border reopened in 2003, 
thousands of Cypriots from the south have travelled across the ‘political divide to 
experience the lands of their ancestors’ (Webster and Timothy, 2006: 177). Similarly, 
Hazbun observes that of the Jordanians travelling to Israel, 90% were of Palestinian origin 
and most cross over to meet relatives. According to Butler and Mao (1996), more than two 
million Chinese crossed over to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War. Most of them were 
military personnel who left their families behind. Today, many Taiwanese tourists visit China 
to re-discover their ancestral and religious roots. China welcomes such ‘return tourism’ by 
their Taiwanese ‘compatriots’ as it fits into the discourse that the two sides are ‘one family’, 
and that Taiwan would eventually ‘return’ to the ‘brotherly love’ of China. Forays into the 
notion of ‘personal heritage’ in the context of the Mazu pilgrimage are refreshing as 
heritage can now be discussed at not only the scale of the national, but also the personal. 
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The body becomes the centre of focus as it transcends geopolitical fault lines and engages in 
the performance and negotiation of one’s identity. As such, Mazu pilgrimages participated 
by Chinese and Taiwanese devotees are seen as potential analytical platforms to develop 
‘new geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ that allow for more pluralistic notions of 
overlapping territorial attachments, and ‘alternative relationships between territory and 
identity…’ (Hazbun, 2009: 33-34). 
In order to gain a better understanding of post-war relations between China and Taiwan, an 
analytical space needs to be reserved for common religious practices like the Mazu 
pilgrimage, as it is occasionally through them that memories of the past are recalled and 
hatred possibly eliminated. The belief in Mazu binds devotees with different political 
allegiance and personal agendas together to fit into the overall discourse of rapprochement. 
Thus, we are moving away from the rationality assumed by the ‘peace through tourism’ 
agenda, and coming to terms with the irrationality of rapprochement tourism. Religious 
activities organised around a popular folk deity like Mazu, and participated by devotees 
from both sides of the Taiwan Strait are generating many novel case studies for research on 
the cultural-geopolitics of rapprochement.  
 
3. Methodology 
Primary data for this paper was collected via semi-structured in-depth interviews with five 
mainland Chinese Mazu devotees and five Taiwanese pilgrims either during or after a Mazu 
pilgrimage. Shorter and more informal interviews were also conducted ‘on-the-go’ as and 
when opportunities arose. Due to the close-knit pilgrim community, all interviewees were 
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recruited via snowball sampling. My respondents were mostly females in their 40s to 60s. 
Many of them are housewives and active members in their respective temple organisations. 
Interviews with the mainland Chinese devotees were conducted in Mandarin, while a 
mixture of Mandarin and Minnan dialect was used when interacting with Taiwanese 
pilgrims. Participant observation was also an important method and was employed in two 
different Mazu pilgrimages. On the first occasion, I signed up for a full pilgrimage with 
Taiwanese pilgrims who set off from Kinmen Island (governed by Taiwan), in order to gain a 
first-hand experience and a more comprehensive understanding of the procedure, 
procession and propitiation ceremonies.  The experience allowed me to better engage with 
respondents during our interviews. Also, by sharing accommodation, attending celebratory 
dinners, and engaging in informal chats with fellow pilgrims, I was able to build rapport with 
potential interviewees. On the second occasion, I took up more of an observer’s role and 
was able to better perceive the politics of interaction and engagement amongst Chinese and 
Taiwanese devotees. It was also during this time that I conducted additional in-depth 
interviews with pilgrimage organisers and a Mazu medium.   
 
4. From seafarers’ guardian to ‘Cross-strait Goddess of Peace’ 
As the legend goes, Mazu was born into the Lin Family on Meizhou Island, off the coast of 
Putian in Fujian Province in 960 A.D. Just before the arrival of the baby, a spectrum of red 
light was cast from the sky into the family’s bedroom, followed by a lingering fragrance in 
the air, and thunder-like rumbles. When she was born, she did not utter a single cry, thus 
her name – Moniang (silent lady). Such ‘signs and wonders’ (Rubinstein, 2003: 183) led her 
family and villagers to believe that she was not an ordinary child. One day when Lin 
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Moniang was 15, her father and brother had gone out to work at sea. She fell into a trance 
at home and could not control her hands and legs. Her mother was terrified and tried to 
wake her up. Upon her returning to consciousness, she cried and demanded to know why 
she was not given enough time to rescue her brother. Moments later, news arrived that a 
boat had capsized at sea and while Moniang’s father survived, her brother drowned. Her 
father told his family of a spectral being saving his life during the ordeal. It became apparent 
that it was indeed Moniang who ‘went’ in aid of her father and brother, but because she 
was revived too early by her mother, she could not get a good grip of her brother, and thus 
he drowned. That was when Moniang’s divine power was realised and she continued to 
lend her hand to seafarers in distress. She did not die a natural death. At the age of 28, she 
ascended to heaven from Meizhou Island. After her ascension she continued to be the 
guardian for fishermen and merchants who ply the treacherous waters of the Taiwan Strait. 
People soon erected a temple for her on Meizhou Island and the local folk deity soon gained 
popularity in the coastal areas of mainland China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. According to 
Maspéro (1963, cited in Irwin, 1990: 63), by 1228, Mazu temples could already be found in 
‘all the maritime provinces of coastal China.’4 As Boltz (1986: 211) professes, Mazu is 
attributed with ‘a vast range of divine power, but overall her reputation rests on her ability 
to rescue those who suffer hazards at sea. As the special guardian of seafaring populations, 
she remains unsurpassed.’ 
Mazu’s efficacy and power was not only recognised by ordinary people, but also 
acknowledged by the ruling elites. Hence we see the numerous official titles conferred to 
Mazu by emperors of different dynasties (from Song to Qing) ranging from Shengfei (Holy 
                                                          
4 Chang’s (2012) piece on the interconnectedness between State and religion in the context of the Dajia Mazu 
pilgrimage in Taiwan provides a succinct background on the official introduction of the Mazu cult to Taiwan in 
1683, and its subsequent rise in popularity and ubiquity on the island.  
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Queen), Tianfei (Celestial Consort), Tianhou (Empress of Heaven) to Tianshang Shengmu 
(the Heavenly Mother). These titles were often bestowed on her for her ‘services to 
mankind’. For instance, she was given credit when she reportedly guided the boat of the 
ambassador to Korea to safety during a storm in the Song Dynasty. Some scholars interpret 
this as a way for rulers to institutionalise the Mazu cult and legitimise their own authority 
(Irwin, 1990). However, such legitimisation is a two-way process. In China, deities also 
needed sanction by the political authorities so as not to be deemed as secret sects and 
therefore illegal. ‘[G]ods are perceived as powerful only insofar as people worship them’ 
(Sangren, 2000: 72). As such, ‘…state recognition and promotion of local deities… in effect 
allows each to tap the other in a process of mutual legitimization’ (ibid.: 77).  
Today, Mazu is hailed by the Chinese, especially in the official account, as the haishang 
heping nüshen (Sea Goddess of Peace) or haixia liang’an heping nüshen (Cross-strait 
Goddess of Peace). A Mazu devotee in Putian expressed:  
As I was born in Mazu’s hometown, I feel very proud that a woman from Putian can 
become a common deity for the Chinese in the world… I feel that by referring to 
deities and religious belief, we are better able to go beyond politics and concentrate 
on a kind of common identity and communication platform [between the Chinese and 
Taiwanese]. This is what I feel as a local. 
Apart from the pride of being born in Mazu’s ancestral hometown, the Chinese devotee 
used a shared religious belief to foster an ‘alternative relationship between territory and 
identity’ (Hazbun, 2009: 33-34). Indeed, the common worshipping of Mazu and the 
pilgrimage tours have provided a welcome relief from sensitive issues of sovereignty and 
 15 
reunification for devotees on both sides of the Strait. Victor Turner (1974) argued that 
pilgrimage is akin to a liminal or liminoid phenomenon. He adapted van Gennep’s three-
phase model of rites of passage and emphasised the middle ‘liminal’ phase to develop his 
idea of ‘communitas’, as ‘a state of equality, comradeship, and common humanity, outside 
of normal social distinctions, roles, and hierarchies’ (Olaveson, 2001: 93). I have discussed 
elsewhere Turner’s idea of the liminal and used it to explicate the socio-psychological states 
of cross-strait tourists (Zhang, 2013). Here, the shared belief in Mazu provides a more 
intimate platform for a communitas to form between its devotees on both sides. This idea 
will be discussed further in the following empirical sections.  
Other than a symbol of cross-strait peace, Mazu, as ‘Heavenly Mother’ to devotees on both 
sides of the Strait, also represents familial ties between China and Taiwan. In this respect, 
the annual pilgrimage has often been promoted as Mazu hui niangjia (Mazu returns to her 
natal home). The ‘Mazu homecoming’ discourse is related to the concept of ling in Taoism. 
As Sangren (2000: 56) explains:  
…ling is one of the key concepts uniting Chinese culture and religion. In brief, ling is a 
kind of magical efficacy attributed to supernatural entities of all sorts – gods, ghosts, 
ancestors, and so forth. Moreover, it is a relative quality: some gods and ghosts are 
more ling than are others. 
Being housed in the ancestral temple, the Mazu on Meizhou Island is regarded as the most 
ling amongst all the other Mazu idols at other cult centres. That is the reason why on the 
23rd day of the third lunar month (Mazu’s birthday), pilgrims will travel to Meizhou Island to 
pay homage to the goddess. Some will even bring along their own Mazu idols and pass them 
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over the ancestral temple’s incense burner. They will then leave them overnight in the 
temple so that the various Mazu idols ‘can take a rest and chat amongst themselves’ 
(Chinese temple staff in Meizhou, personal communication) (Figure 1). Devotees believe 
that by doing so, the ling of their Mazu idols will be recharged. It is therefore not difficult to 
understand the Chinese government’s keenness to harness the popularity of Mazu for its 
reunification aims. With a basic knowledge of the cult established, the following sections 
will explicate the cultural-geopolitics of the Mazu pilgrimage and how it creates spaces of 
the political within which the identities of Taiwanese pilgrims and that of their Chinese 
counterparts are being performed.   
 
 
Figure 1 Mazu idols from different temples being assembled with the main idol in the Meizhou 
ancestral temple 
 
5. When movement takes on meanings 
The mobility aspect of a pilgrimage takes on a myriad of cultural-geopolitical meanings at a 
variety of different scales. In the following, I look at what the movement of Taiwanese 
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pilgrims across the Strait means to Chinese and Taiwanese governments, the management 
of a cult centre in Taiwan and the pilgrims themselves. Before the relaxation of the travel 
prohibition of Taiwanese to mainland China by the nationalist government in 1987, Mazu 
pilgrimage was deemed illegal. Since 1987, the number of Taiwanese pilgrims travelling 
across the Strait has increased considerably. However, they were not allowed to travel 
directly to mainland China and had to take a detour mostly via Hong Kong.5 When the 
leadership of Taichung’s Zhenlan Gong (Zhenlan Temple) (one of the main Mazu cult centres 
in Taiwan) proposed a direct pilgrimage to Meizhou Island by sea in 2000, the proposal was 
heavily politicised and further polarised the two main political parties in Taiwan – the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). Katz (2003) reports that the 
temple leader, Yen Ching-piao, and representatives from the KMT party even gathered at 
Zhenlan Temple to throw divination blocks in order for Mazu to ‘decide’ on the date of 
departure. After the date was decided with the impending direct pilgrimage just one and a 
half months away, this issue created political mayhem between the KMT supporters and the 
then newly-formed Chen Shui-bian’s government. The pro-independence DPP, which Chen 
led, was clearly not in favour of such direct pilgrimages to mainland China as that would 
imply an acknowledgement of Chinese roots. Chen attempted to convince the Taiwanese 
people that participation would only be complying with China’s propaganda efforts (Katz, 
2003). Considering the long-standing pro-status quo stance of the KMT with regards to 
cross-strait issues, I would argue, however, that the support for a direct pilgrimage to 
                                                          
5 Direct flights between China and Taiwan started in 2008 under the Ma Ying-jeou’s administration.  
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mainland China by the KMT was more of an act of opposing everything that the DPP stood  
for, rather than representing an ideological reunification with mainland China.6     
The Taiwanese government did not grant approval for the sealink in 2000. Zhenlan Temple 
then led over two thousand Mazu devotees from across Taiwan on an indirect pilgrimage via 
Hong Kong. Pilgrims flew from Taiwan to Hong Kong, then to Xiamen in Fujian. From Xiamen, 
they boarded chartered coaches to Putian City and reached Meizhou Island by ferry. 
Zhenlan Temple invited several Taiwanese television news stations and newspapers to cover 
the six-day event, paid for the airfare and hotel accommodations of over 80 media 
personnel, and arranged for the pilgrimage to be broadcast live via satellite television from 
China back to Taiwan (Yang, 2004). The ability to mobilise such a large group of pilgrims and 
manpower on both sides of the Strait was a testament to  the temple’s intent to not only 
pressure the Taiwanese government over the establishment of a ‘direct religious sealink’ 
(China Times, 9 June 2000), but also to assert its authority as one of Taiwan’s leading Mazu 
temples. In a sense, Mazu was used by the temple leaders to protest against policies and 
decisions of the Taiwanese government (see also, Chang, 2012).  
Conversely, the Chinese government, especially local officials from Fujian Province, who had 
considered the financial gains and ideological meanings of such direct pilgrimages, were 
more than willing to welcome the Taiwanese pilgrims. Yet, Beijing is also ‘nervous about the 
dissemination of a popular grassroots religious organization among local people, and it 
aggressively limits and monitors the movements of Taiwanese pilgrims’ (Yang, 2004: 216). 
How meaningful is the Mazu pilgrimage to an individual then? Here, I observe that there is a 
                                                          
6 In 2000, the KMT became an opposition party for the first time in its history after losing the administration of 
the central government to the DPP. The KMT, unlike the pro-independence DPP, was pro-status quo and 
would neither have supported independence nor reunification. 
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disjuncture in the appropriation of Mazu between the state and the individual in terms of its 
significance and meaning. For example, the Taiwanese state prefers to recognise Mazu as a 
national heroine for her assistance to Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) in his expulsion of the 
Dutch colonisers from Taiwan, while Chinese officials are keen to stress the peace-keeping 
attribute of Mazu (thus the title ‘Sea Goddess of Peace’ – haishang heping nüshen). For the 
individual, however, it is Mazu’s magical efficacy in dealing with everyday problems that is 
most cherished. After numerous conversations with Taiwanese pilgrims during my fieldwork, 
I realised that although they were  aware of the rapprochement climate and conscious 
about the Chinese promotion of Mazu as Sea Goddess of Peace, the discourse of Mazu as 
cross-strait peace-maker is  ‘politically correct’ but not quite relevant to their personal 
motivations for participating in a pilgrimage. Madam Hong, a Taiwanese pilgrim in her 50s, 
shared how it was a personal pact with Mazu to join the annual event: 
I had an agreement with Mazu last year when I went to Meizhou. If she keeps my 
knees strong, I will return again the next year to thank her and make offerings to her. 
True enough, my knees did not give me any problems throughout the last year and I 
saved a lot of money that would have otherwise gone to the doctor! So I mainly went 
back to thank her for her grace and mercy.  
Indeed, many of the pilgrims went on the pilgrimage to thank the goddess for answering 
their prayers (huanyuan). Yet, there were others who claimed that they were being 
‘instructed’ by Mazu to join the procession, and hoped that by following her instructions, 
their wishes would be granted. It was the expression of gratitude for miracles that had 
already taken place and the hope for more divine help in the future that contributed to the 
‘collective production of divine power’ (Sangren, 2000: 90).  
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For many pilgrims, the ritual procession itself was a meaningful event. During the pilgrimage 
from Kinmen to Meizhou, which I participated, Mazu idols were ‘invited’ from the temples 
where they reside, and were literally taken on board coaches and ferries to reach the 
destination. Once on Meizhou Island after a ten-minute ferry ride from the mainland, the 
Mazu idols were seated on sedan chairs, ready for the 500m procession towards the 
ancestral temple situated on high grounds (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Pilgrims preparing their Mazu idol and sedan chair for a procession 
 
 
The ‘islandness’ of such a cult centre and the idea of negotiating the ‘mountain’ (although 
only at a height of about 30m) to reach the ancestral temple contributed significantly to the 
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overall sacredness of the pilgrimage.7 Amidst the blasting of firecrackers, Chinese trumpets, 
drums, gongs and cymbals, the ritual procession started in earnest. At some point during 
the procession, sedan chairs could be seen swinging violently from side to side as handlers, 
both women and men, tried to regain control of them; the tempo of the drums, gongs and 
cymbals keeping up with their movement. Handlers of Mazu’s sedan chair have often 
shared their experiences of feeling the force of the goddess running through the chair itself, 
thus the rocking movement as they paraded towards the ancestral temple (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Pilgrims carrying their Mazu idol in her sedan chair 
 
 
Such ‘divine power’ also manifested itself in corporeal ways respondents argued. One of my 
informants, Mdm Lee, told me about how she had suffered from rheumatism of her 
shoulder joints and that Mazu appeared in her dream one night to instruct her to help out in 
                                                          
7 According to Naquin and Yü (1992:11), ‘The classic form of [a Chinese] pilgrimage involves a journey to a 
temple on a mountain peak… The principal objective is to make contact with the resident deity (shen 神), 
whose image is enshrined in the mountain temple.’  
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the local temple’s pilgrimage to Meizhou. She complied and performed the role as one of 
Mazu’s ‘servants in waiting’ during the procession. Half way through the journey from the 
pier to the ancestral temple, she could feel a certain energy surging through her body, as if 
helping her along the way, and her shoulders felt less tense after the procession. This 
testimony and the experience of the sedan chair handlers bring to mind Sangren’s (2000: 
111) description of a pilgrimage as ‘scared time’ as devotees believe Mazu will very likely 
‘manifest her power’ (xianling) during a pilgrimage. For the sedan chair experience, the 
divine power is materialised through the swinging and rocking of the chair. For Lee, her 
encounter with divinity was more of an embodied experience. Importantly, ‘these were 
bodies, both material and immaterial, in contact, relation, movement, and rhythm’ 
(McCormack, 2002, cited in Holloway, 2006: 184).  
As is evident from the above accounts of spiritual encounters, as much as the Chinese 
authorities would wish to idealise Mazu’s role in reunification, the Taiwanese pilgrims are 
actually ‘returning’ to Meizhou, the sacred island where Mazu Temple resides, rather than 
China per se. They are in pursuit of religious sacredness, be it individually or as a group, not 
political unification with China. The movement of the entourage of devotees during the 
ritual procession, and the performance of roles like sedan chair handlers and servants in 
waiting are all part and parcel of a collective spiritual experience. As Yang (2004: 216) 
espouses, ‘Rather than the political unification of China and Taiwan, it would seem that 
cross-strait Mazu pilgrimages are creating a regional ritual space and religious community of 
Chinese coastal peoples that do not conform to existing political borders’. Yet, a common 
ritual space and religious community comprising of both Taiwanese and Chinese devotees 
are cornerstones for the formation of a ‘communitas’ (Turner, 1974), and a platform of 
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interaction for people on both sides of the Strait. This will be discussed in the following 
section.  
 
6. Pilgrimage as a social(ising) activity   
While the procession might be one of the most popular activities during a pilgrimage, time 
spent in coaches, ferries and restaurants before and after the procession can be equally as 
productive in creating spaces of encounter amongst pilgrims. Such pockets of interspersed 
space-time were meaningful as devotees – some familiar to each other, some not – shared 
their spiritual encounters. One’s testimonial on how she/he was blessed by Mazu would be 
acknowledged by nods of agreement before others chipped in with their own experiences. 
During my fieldwork, although the procession was performed predominantly by Taiwanese 
pilgrims, their Chinese hosts often joined them for meals during the pilgrimage period, and 
it was during such space-time that interactions took place. According to Chen (1984, cited in 
Sangren, 2000: 91), ‘…participating in the pilgrimage is essentially an engagement in a 
legend-telling session. The incense guests [pilgrims] like to exchange their own memorates 
[testimonies] to invite friendly conversation.’ In this sense, a pilgrimage is as much a social 
activity as it is a socialising one. The sharing of testimonies is a performance of a pilgrim’s 
religiosity, and the act of relating spectral encounters with Mazu to fellow pilgrims is a 
validation of one’s self-identity/faith vis-à-vis those of other devotees, thus rendering these 
instances of space-time as meaningful as the actual ritual procession. Indeed, religious 
space overflows the fixities of the temple and the fluidities of the procession; it manifests 
itself in these in-between places where the ‘faith-as-personal’ boundary is redrawn to 
incorporate a more communal sense of the Mazu cult. Furthermore, such cross-strait 
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pilgrimages also encourage the production of liminal spaces where differences in people’s 
identities and/or political allegiance seem to be transcended in favour of a pilgrim 
‘communitas’ (Sangren, 1987; Turner, 1974; Turner and Turner, 1978). A Chinese devotee I 
interviewed shared, “I think Mazu acts as an important communicative medium for two 
people who are under different political systems. She is a very important force…a 
medium…When surrounding Mazu, we can shed away a lot of our political baggage”. These 
liminal spaces allow ‘sensuous impulses [to] flourish and… normative codifications of 
identity and practice [to] be suspended’ (Holloway, 2006: 183). It is clear, therefore, that 
such in-between places and times are platforms for socialising and binding pilgrims into a 
collective.  
However, my participant observations also revealed differences within this supposed unity 
of the pilgrims. In his observation of Mazu pilgrimages within Taiwan, Sangren (2000) notes 
that the annual pilgrimages have the sociological effect of ‘unit[ing] Taiwanese into a single 
ritual community’ (p. 76). There is continuity with this sense of Taiwaneseness in the 
context of a cross-strait Mazu pilgrimage especially when the entourage of Taiwanese 
pilgrims parade their Mazu idols through the Chinese streets, passing homes and shops. Due 
to its more elaborated style, and the sheer number of its participants, a Taiwanese 
procession is often greeted by local devotees who will line both sides of the streets and look 
in awe at the spectacle. Some even set up tables of food offerings in anticipation of the 
passing procession and burn incense to welcome the numerous ‘Taiwanese Mazu’ idols. The 
Taiwanese pilgrims I communicated with expressed their pride as they processed past the 
local people, and highlighted that they managed to preserve the Mazu cult traditions better 
than their Chinese counterparts, and were ‘superior’ in terms of their religious know-how.  
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Differences were also observed amongst the Taiwanese pilgrims too. The richer and thus 
more influential of the temple groups had more elaborated dresses and accessories for their 
goddesses, bigger sedan chairs and marched at the front of the procession. The identity of 
each group was very clearly represented by the cloth banner, embroidered with the name 
of its Mazu temple, behind which its followers marched. Therefore, as much as the 
pilgrimage seems to have created a united religious community, it has also contributed in 
erecting borders of differences, either between the ‘more religious’ Taiwanese pilgrims and 
local Chinese onlookers, or amongst the Taiwanese pilgrims themselves. Here, ‘identities 
are not so much temporarily discarded as they are foregrounded in such pilgrimage 
performances’ (Sangren, 2000: 99). 
The Mazu pilgrimage is at once an event that serves individuals’ spiritual needs as well as a 
remarkable assemblage of politics, people, spirits and things. When Chinese and Taiwanese 
pilgrims interact with each other, the cultural identity of being fellow Mazu devotees or 
‘children of Mazu’ takes precedence over national identity. This discourse of sameness is 
dominant in Taiwanese pilgrims’ responses when asked about their views on their Chinese 
counterparts. However, as explicated above, I caution against a naïve take on such blanket-
covering identity based solely on similarities between devotees from both sides. The 
enchantment of divine power does not work on the basis of the same, nor does it function 
through complete difference. Mdm Liu, a Taiwanese medium, shared with me her religious 
autobiography and how Mazu instructed her to carry out voluntary/humanitarian work in 
mainland China. Below are snippets of her enchanting experience in Putian:  
You are interviewing the Mazu medium who has saved millions of people… 
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Mazu has instructed me to come to the mainland, to attain a higher level [shenzao], to 
learn more ‘kung fu’ [skills]…to learn…So sometimes I have to come here two to three 
times a year... 
Mazu just comes to me…possesses me…and I will be able to feel it. She will possess 
me, and will go to various places to pray, to do volunteer work or to save people with 
terminal illnesses. 
For example, over a three-year period, I rescued three daughters of someone who 
volunteers at the Mazu temple in Putian. Each time, they were in critical condition, 
even the doctor couldn’t do anything… because they were suffering from ‘formless 
illness’ [wuxing bing] 
Twelve years ago, I came on a pilgrimage. The temple was very unhygienic 
then…people spit on the ground…very dirty… That’s why I was determined to help. I 
treated it just like my own house… I cleaned the toilets, kitchen, 
sinks…everywhere…everything… 
The bed was extremely dirty…they were being bitten by mice…just like those you see 
at a rubbish dump… the bathroom, toilet, sink and so on. I paid for new ones. 
This journey is very tiring…needs a lot of money too…it is not just about volunteering. I 
donated too… all these years…I’ve donated quite a lot of money…could be around a 
few million RMB. 
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My younger brother suggested that I could buy a house here and rent it out to people 
and earn some rental. But Mazu told me not to and instead donate the money to the 
temple.  
Mazu will not differentiate… people from both sides are all her children… As long as 
you are sincere, no matter where you are, I believe Mazu will always protect you…  
As can be seen from these extracts, Mdm Liu is obviously proud of her achievements as a 
Mazu medium. She perceives herself as an embodiment of Mazu’s divine power in her 
intervention into the everyday lives of Chinese devotees, who like her, are ‘all Mazu’s 
children’, but meanwhile different in terms of political allegiance and economic and spiritual 
well-being. In highlighting the existence of ‘formless illnesses’ – something that even 
modern science cannot address, she established a rationale for the divine healing power 
that she possessed through Mazu, and gave ontological status to the deity. Additionally, Liu 
also demonstrates that she is fulfilling Mazu’s calls and deems such cross-strait missions as 
‘training sessions’ and a path to attaining greater divine power. Her efforts in renovating the 
temple, donating money and even in overcoming a dilemma to profit from the housing 
market8 were used to valorise her commitment to Mazu and her Chinese devotees. Indeed, 
the experience of communitas is ‘usually a “deep” or intense one, and belongs in the 
intuitive or emotional realm, as opposed to the rational one’ (Turner, 1969; 1974, cited in 
Olaveson, 2001: 104). Yet, the volunteering aspect of Liu’s ‘religious duty’ is as much a 
humanitarian effort contributing to the betterment of her patron’s society as it is a means 
towards her own personal ends to enhance her contact with the deity, and in the process 
gain ‘greater divine power’. Furthermore, as observed from Liu’s testimony, although both 
                                                          
8 Scholars of religion have reported that pilgrimage and religious networks are often intertwined with 
economic ones (see for example, Raj and Morpeth, 2007).  
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Taiwanese and Chinese devotees are children of Mazu, they are not deemed to be equal, be 
it financially or spiritually. This relates to the earlier assertion that ‘The enchantment of 
divine power does not work on the basis of the same, nor does it function through complete 
difference.’ Although the Taiwanese medium identified herself with her Chinese 
counterparts as ‘children of Mazu’, it was the perceived differences in the standard of living 
and religious know-how that urged the medium to offer her services, and thus provided a 
platform for her to practice her craft and nourish her enchanting encounters with Mazu. 
The fleeting transcendence between sameness and difference in the socialising process is 
also exhibited in the interactions between Mazu organisations from both sides. Although a 
similar religious conviction has allowed such cultural entities to be at the forefront of the 
rapprochement process, their inherent differences is one of the key reasons that draw them 
to each other in the first place. After the Cultural Revolution and the re-establishment of 
cross-strait ties, there was a huge incentive for the Chinese and Taiwanese governments to 
utilise common religions as socialising platforms for their people. However, many customs 
and rituals concerning the Mazu cult in China were lost. These need to be re-introduced by 
the Taiwanese devotees during pilgrimages, and here is where temple organisations from 
Taiwan usually play the ‘big brother’ role. As Mr Ding, a representative from one of the 
Mazu cult centres in Taiwan enthused: 
They have lost those traditions…propitiation to the goddess (bai bai)…recital of 
religious scriptures (songjing)…The recital team (songjing tuan) in the Meizhou 
ancestral temple was trained by us. They had no idea of food offerings too. When I 
brought apples there, they thought they were fake! Haha! Joss sticks and incense 
paper were also re-introduced by us. 
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Now on Meizhou Island, there are proper rituals commemorating Mazu’s birthday, 
and the day she ascended to heaven. At her birthplace at Xianliang Gang, there is even 
a sea prayer event. We have re-introduced them to those rituals performed by our 
ancestors.  
Such encounters reflect a reversal of roles in China-Taiwan relations. China has always 
positioned itself as the ‘big brother’ who is the legitimate player in international politics. In 
terms of rapprochement, it sees itself as the magnanimous elder sibling, always forgiving, 
and always yearning for the homecoming of his other half with open arms.9 However, in the 
enchanted world of the Mazu pilgrimage, it is the Taiwanese game that the Chinese are 
trying to get a foothold on. In terms of the know-how of Mazu pilgrimage, the Taiwanese 
have an advantage over their Chinese counterparts, and therefore, play the ‘big brother’ 
role instead. They know that the Chinese authorities are mainly utilising Mazu as a 
unification platform, but are happy to play along with it. As the ensuing paragraphs will 
make clear, the Taiwanese Mazu organisations might have separate sets of agendas other 
than reunification with the mainland. These agendas may include the aim to revive the 
Mazu cult in China, and elevating their status as cult centres in Taiwan.  A Taiwanese pilgrim 
revealed: 
To be honest, we jolly well know that the mainland is trying to use Mazu as a tool for 
unification (tongzhan), but what they do not understand is that Taiwan’s Mazu culture 
is so well established and deeply embedded in our lives; our devotees are even more 
religious than theirs. There is no way that they can pull us over! Haha…But they 
thought since we are so devoted to Mazu, they will use Mazu as a bridge for both 
                                                          
9 China has consistently utilised the rhetoric of family or brotherhood when dealing with Taiwan in the 
rapprochement era. 
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sides to communicate. This is not a bad thing though. So before we talk about politics, 
we use Mazu culture as a topic of exchange…. 
From this response, it is clear that the ‘Chinese intentions’ are very much in the 
consciousness of Taiwanese Mazu devotees. Here we can appreciate the complexities of 
national and religious identities at play in a pilgrimage: it is never a simple replacement of 
one with another but a strategic manoeuvre at times. Turner’s version of communitas 
‘entails that the actors in ritual and pilgrimage processes leave a domain where relations are 
complex, for one where they are simple. Their relations with others are…no longer those of 
interconnectedness but of similarity: no longer do they occupy social positions in a 
hierarchical or segmentary structure of localised status roles; now they are assigned to a 
class of anonymous novices or plainly and uniformly garbed pilgrims, all torn or self-torn 
from their familiar systemic environment’ (1979: 122). It is true, to a certain extent, that the 
Mazu pilgrims do put their political baggage aside while harnessing a common religious 
identity for interaction. However, it is less straightforward as hierarchy does exist in terms 
of religious ‘know-how’, and ‘state territoriality’ and ‘ritual territoriality’ are not in sync 
(Yang, 2004). Taiwanese temple organisations, with their separate sets of agendas, are 
obviously taking advantage of the rapprochement climate to further their interests in 
reviving the Mazu cult in China. As such, these organisations felt obliged to re-educate their 
counterparts on how propitiation of Mazu should proceed.  
Nevertheless, Turner did remind us that the idea of a communitas is not static. In other 
words, it has its creative potentials: ‘Liminality is not only transition, but also potentiality, 
not only “going to be”, but also “what may be”’ (Turner and Turner, 1978: 3).  There was a 
hint towards the end of my interview with Mr Ding that the Mazu pilgrimage could indeed 
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be a formidable force in generating curiosity and actually promoting cultural exchange and 
integration of social collectives. As he shared further:  
One official from Putian City came to our temple and participated in the entire 9-day 
Mazu procession. He went back to China and held an exhibition on Taiwan’s Mazu 
culture – showing people there the popularity of Mazu in Taiwan. 
I have also written a couple of books on Mazu…the most recent one is on ancient 
couplets (duilian) carved on the pillars of Taiwanese Mazu temples that made 
references to Meizhou Island. I want to tell people that although they might not know 
their counterparts in Meizhou, the couplets that were carved a few hundred years ago 
were testament that they share the same roots…Such cross-strait culture still needs 
everyone’s effort to be patient and communicate more and understand more… 
We learn from them too. For example, through historical records in China we learned 
about the Mazu Feast (Mazu yan) – an ancient way of making offerings to Mazu that 
was even more elaborated than what we have in Taiwan. We also brought the Taiwan 
style to China and showed it to them. This is one way for knowledge to be exchanged.   
And in 2000, we performed a full-scale Taiwanese-style Mazu procession in the 
mainland. We brought over all our traditional equipment and props. The event was 
even telecast live in China and Taiwan.  
Our temple has made pilgrimages to Meizhou Island for the past 24 years…Through 
these years, cross-strait cultural exchanges have matured… In the future, we still need 
to depend on Mazu to act as a bridge for both sides to communicate, because both 
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sides can’t agree with each other’s political stand…So by using local cultural events as 
a platform for communication…politics and confrontations can be avoided. The 
greatest credit must be given to Mazu for acting as a bridge…a nest for cross-strait 
communication to nurture. 
Ding’s account of how Mazu pilgrimage acts as a bridge for cultural exchanges offers an idea 
of how a common religious identity between post-conflict societies can be used to harness 
new ‘geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ (Hazbun, 2009). Such a sense of community is 
not based on national identity, but imagined along religious affinity. Heritage in this case, is 
not something managed by the state, but one that is personal, and appeals to ordinary 
people in search of ancestral roots. The exhibiting of Mazu culture in China, the writing of 
books on historical religious connections between the people, the teaching and learning 
between devotees through various Mazu events, are all elements for creating alternative 
communities that go beyond partisan politics between the Communists, the KMT, and the 
DPP. These imaginaries allow for a common religious heritage between post-conflict 
societies to be engaged at personal levels, and are cornerstones for building a pilgrim 
communitas.   
 
7. Conclusions: From state-level diplomatic exchanges to ‘interactions along the side’ 
By drawing on cultural relations at the everyday level, rather than political relations at the 
level of the state, this paper offers new insights into the geopolitical relations between 
China and Taiwan. I shall concentrate on four points by way of conclusion. First, I have 
shown how religion plays a part in the rapprochement between China and Taiwan. 
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Discussion at a variety of scales – from that of the state, to temple associations and the 
personal provides an avenue to go beyond dominant state-level analyses of cross-strait 
relations. As much as Mazu is incorporated into both governments’ political agendas and 
the interests of temple organisations, the cult also represents a form of personal heritage 
for pilgrims. Belief in the efficacy of the sea goddess is the main driving force behind the 
continued interaction of devotees across the Strait, and a continual commitment in 
unravelling personal experiences of encounters amongst Chinese and Taiwanese devotees 
will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between pilgrimage 
and tourism across borders of conflict. 
Second, I turn to Victor Turner’s concept of ‘communitas’ to elucidate the different ways in 
which a pilgrimage is as much a social activity as it is a socialising one. Rather than seeing it 
as purely a social/cultural phenomenon, I highlighted the spatial and temporal qualities of a 
pilgrim communitas through the pockets of space-time where and when devotees 
temporarily put aside their political allegiance and engage in conversations about spiritual 
experiences with Mazu. Yet communitas is not entirely about ‘sameness’. It is often the 
complexities between sameness and difference that initiate, sustain or disrupt interactions. 
Moreover, as the discussion shows, there is a plurality of identities at play during 
pilgrimage-tours. Rather than just a simple replacement of one identity with another, the 
pilgrim-tourist experiences a plethora of identity-defining and identity-making moments 
such that it is unclear when one identity starts and the other ends. Indeed, identities within 
a pilgrim communitas are always in the making, but never made. It is on this basis that 
religious spaces are not quite ‘already there’ but are constantly being performed through 
the pilgrimage and inscribed with personal meanings.  
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Third, and following on from the previous point, religious activity across borders of conflict 
is seen less as a political tool than one that possesses a life of its own and is actively 
producing platforms for interaction. Therefore, contrary to critiques that Turner’s ideas are 
‘somewhat static’ (see Lin, 2014), a communitas is constantly evolving. Devotees from both 
China and Taiwan are cognizant of the creative potentials of the Mazu cult and its 
associated events in binding people together. There is evidence that such cultural activities 
are beginning to move beyond state-sanctioned definitions and are actually defining new 
frontiers of ‘geopolitical and geocultural imaginaries’ (Hazbun, 2009). Hence, there is 
potential for alternative communities to take root via religion-led activities, but more 
research is needed to see whether this will flourish into some kind of ‘shared humanity’ 
(Bauman, cited in Franklin, 2003).  
Finally, rapprochement between China and Taiwan, as interpreted by the paper, has got more 
to do with ‘interactions along the side’ than state-level diplomatic exchanges. Moreover, we 
begin to engage with the language of affect as understood in an enchanted world, rather than 
the logic of meaning in a secular one. Instead of adopting a rationality of ‘peace through 
tourism’ (e.g. the belief that people will better understand and be less fearful of each other 
through increased tourism exchanges etc.), we are coming to terms with the non-rationality 
of rapprochement tourism as evident in experiences like possession of the medium’s body by 
Mazu or spiritual communication between devotees and deity while participating in a ritual 
procession. These are experiences that seem outlandish in the first instance, but the shared 
belief in the existence of the otherworldly gives credibility to the power of the enchanted 
world. Further studies need to go beyond the ‘more-than-state’ and engage with the ‘more-
than-human’ in order to gain a more profound understanding of this enchanted world. But for 
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now, we need to acknowledge that rapprochement tourism is more about affect than effect; 
emotion than reason; feeling than meaning. It is on such a basis that we can remain open to 
many possibilities when analysing cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan.  
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